前世行经济学家 Joseph Stiglitz 全球化以及金融危机启示录

美股(meigu) · 2019年05月05日 · 63 次阅读

约瑟夫·尤金·斯蒂格利茨(英语:Joseph Eugene Stiglitz,1943年2月9日-),前世界银行副总裁以及首席经济学家,哥伦比亚大学教员。是新凯恩斯主义的追随者,同时他和保罗克鲁格曼(Paul Krugman)在许多观点上有着相似性。(摘自: 老虎社区)

斯蒂格利茨出生于美国印第安那州加里,1965年毕业于阿默斯特学院,1965年至1966年间在芝加哥大学跟随宇泽弘文学习数理经济学,24岁跳级获得麻省理工学院博士,之后前往在剑桥大学从事研究工作,26岁被耶鲁大学聘为经济学正教授。

斯蒂格利茨于1979年获得约翰·贝茨·克拉克奖,2001年获得诺贝尔经济学奖。斯蒂格利茨曾担任世界银行资深副总裁与首席经济师,提出经济全球化的许多观点。他还曾经在国际货币基金组织任职。 2011至2014年是国际经济协会主席。

在美国,没有哪一个群体对经济理论的排斥程度超过政治家。对政治家们来说,经济理论纯属空想。因此,当杰出的经济学家在华盛顿担任要职时,他们的上司总是持怀疑、排斥、甚至直接拒绝的态度。

约翰逊政府的首席经济学家——阿瑟·奥肯,曾经坚持认为,如果政府削减税收,又同时在越战和社会福利上花费过多的话,通货膨胀将加速。约翰逊没有理睬他。同样地,里根也没有接受马丁·费尔德斯坦关于大幅度削减税收和增加预算赤字的理论。高赤字政策的神话在此后的15年间就破灭了。

现在轮到斯蒂格利茨了。虽然他也许是同代人中最伟大的经济学家,但在白宫总统经济顾问团的四年中(其中后两年担任该团主席),他并没有受到重用。不过55岁的他没有退回斯坦福去当教授,而是在去年接受了一个更引人注目的职位——世界银行高级副总裁兼首席经济学家。在那里,以亚洲金融危机为契机,他静静地使用理论来重塑政策,而远离了自己从不擅长的政治角逐。

斯蒂格利茨为人和善,天性乐观,乐于在演讲台上阐述自己的观点,在经济学领域中是一名无可争议的巨人。他的名声来自于一种有趣的理论,这种理论用简单的语言来表述,听起来就和非经济学家的常识一样。

传统的经济学认为,在自由的,不受管制的市场中,个人追求各自的利益会使整个社会的福利最大化。斯蒂格利茨认为现实世界并不是那么回事。相反,他认为,因为市场参与者不能得到充分的信息,市场的功能是不完善的,常常对人们的利益造成损害。所以政府和其他机构必须巧妙地对市场进行干预,以使市场正常运作。

斯蒂格利茨利用经济学界最为推崇的工具——模拟经济行为的数学和计算机模型——来修正传统的理论。这为他赢得了一大批追随者,尤其是年轻的经济学家。

“我采用的逻辑和使人们相信市场有效的那种逻辑一样,”他说,“我只改变了信息完全的假设,找出一种把不完全信息模型化的方式。当你运用这个新模型的时候,你会发现市场总是无效的。”

来看看保险,这是70年代使斯蒂格利茨成名的课题。保险公司不能完全区分高风险和低风险的客户——例如那些房屋毁于火灾的可能性极大的和房屋不太可能起火的客户。对所有人索要同样高的保险费,只会吸引风险最大的顾客,而那些风险小的客户很可能就不买保险了。过多的高风险客户很快就使保险公司债台高筑。

所以保险公司要“干预”。他们限制保险额度,对每个人都不给足他想要的偿付额,使他们有安装防火装置和采取其他预防措施的动机。此外,全额保险的保费非常的高;低风险的客户通过提高可扣除费用,只需支付少得多的保费。

出于同样的逻辑,斯蒂格利茨认为,政府的干预是有正当理由的。他的入门教材《经济学》(诺顿公司,1997年),虽然在本国销量一般,但在中国和日本非常畅销。这本书开头就引述1980年**为克莱斯勒公司作担保的故事作为政府成功干预经济的例子。自由市场的倡导者认为克莱斯勒的破产会把工厂、工人的原材料解放出来投入更有效率的使用,虽然这个转换的过程很痛苦,但是他提到克莱斯勒在得到政府从未为其支付的担保后东山再起。他说,不仅工人的工作得到了保护,政府还节省了数亿美元。因为如果克莱勒倒闭,政府必须支付这笔钱。

克莱斯勒的事例是规则,而不是例外。“在我的模型中,我总是能找到一种特定的干预方式,使人人都受益。”斯蒂格利茨说。

斯蒂格利茨提出「自由贸易三原则」:

首先,任何贸易协议必须是对等的。

举例而言,如果在跨太平洋战略经济伙伴关系协议(TPP)谈判中美国要求日本放弃对稻米的补贴,美国也应该放弃农作物生产成本以及灌溉水的补贴,不仅仅是对稻米的补贴——因为稻米并不是美国的主要出口产品,对美国不重要——并且也应该放弃对其他农作物的补贴。

(First, any trade agreement has to be symmetrical. If, as part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the US demands that Japan eliminate its rice subsidies, the US should in turn offer to eliminate its production and water subsidies, not just on rice — which is relatively unimportant in the US — but on other agricultural commodities as well.)

第二,贸易协议不应把商业利益放在国家利益之上,尤其是当FTA会影响到金融管制与智慧财产权的情况之下。

举例而言,美国跟智利的FTA禁止智利的资本管制措施。可是IMF认定资本管制措施是总体经济控管的一种良好的金融政策工具。

(美国)其他的FTA也坚持要求对手国开放金融业跟解除管制,可是2008年的金融风暴已经教育我们:没有良好的金融业监管,会危害经济繁荣。美国制药业和美国贸易代表办公室(USTR)联手,成功地压迫其他国家接受不平衡的智慧财产权保护条款;这些条款会使得对手国一定要跟美国大药厂买品牌学名药而不能跟非原厂买非专利仿制药,也因此会使得药厂的利益(超高药价逼使穷人买不起药)建立于很多人牺牲了因为使用学名药救命的机会。美国最高法院现在也已经宣布,美国专利局对于相关专利的颁布太过宽松。

(Second, no trade agreement should put commercial interests ahead of broader national interests, especially when non-trade-related issues like financial regulation and intellectual property are at stake. For example, the US' trade agreement with Chile impedes Chile's use of capital controls — even though the IMF now recognizes that capital controls can be an important instrument of macro-prudential policy.

Other trade agreements have insisted on financial liberalization and deregulation as well, even though the 2008 crisis should have taught the world that the absence of good regulation can jeopardize economic prosperity. The US' pharmaceutical industry, which wields considerable clout with the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), has succeeded in foisting on other countries an unbalanced intellectual property regime, which as it is designed to fight generic drugs, puts profit ahead of saving lives. Even the US Supreme Court has now said that the US Patent Office went too far in granting patents on genes.) ”

最后,谈判过程必须透明化,但是那些(跟美国谈判的国家)需要警觉:美国的贸易谈判是黑箱作业,USTR甚至拒绝向美国国会透露谈判底线。根据已经外泄的讯息,其实不难理解为什么会这样:USTR正在逆转(改变)美国国会先前在FTA中加入的条款(例如跟秘鲁签的FTA),那项条款可以让秘鲁的穷人买到非专利仿制药(相对应于美国大药厂生产的专利品牌药)。

(Finally, there must be a commitment to transparency, but those engaging in these trade negotiations should be forewarned: The US is committed to a lack of transparency. The USTR's office has been reluctant to reveal its negotiating position even to members of the US Congress ; on the basis of what has been leaked, one can understand why. The USTR's office is backtracking on principles — for example, access to generic medicines — that the US Congress had inserted into earlier trade agreements, like that with Peru.) ”

斯蒂格利茨认为,如果自由贸易协定不能符合这三个原则,就不应该签署,否则就会妨害国家社会的利益。斯蒂格利茨认为,自由贸易协定只对有钱人好,对其他人则根本只有坏处。

以下是Joseph Stiglitz接受Nathan的访谈,话题聚焦在奥巴马的政策以及全球化。

Nathan Gardels: Barack Obama has said the Wall Street meltdown is the greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression. John McCain says the economy is threatened, but fundamentally strong. Which is it?

内森·加德尔斯(Nathan Gardels):巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)表示华尔街崩盘是大萧条以来最严重的金融危机。 约翰麦凯恩表示经济受到威胁,但(美国经济)基本面强劲。 这是什么?

Joseph Stiglitz: Obama is much closer to the mark. Yes, America has talented people, great universities and a good hi-tech sector. But the financial markets have played a very important role, accounting for 30 percent of corporate profits in the last few years.

约瑟夫斯蒂格利茨:奥巴马的说法更准确。 是的,美国拥有才华横溢的人才,优秀的大学和优秀的高科技产业。 但金融市场发挥了非常重要的作用,在过去几年中占公司利润的30%。

Those who run the financial markets have garnered those profits on the argument they were helping manage risk and efficiently allocating capital, which is why, they said, they “deserved” those high returns.

那些经营金融市场的人已经在他们帮助管理风险和有效分配资金的论点上获得了这些利润,这就是为什么他们说“他们应得”获得高回报(讽刺华尔街精英)。

That’s been shown to be not true. They’ve managed it all badly. Now it has come back to bite them and now the rest of the economy will pay as the wheels of commerce slow because of the credit crunch. No modern economy can function well without a vibrant financial sector.

事实证明这不是真的。 他们完全妥协了。 现在它(金融危机)已经回来咬他们(华尔街精英们),现在由于信贷紧缩,其他经济部门将因为商业的周期轮动而付出惨烈代价。 没有充满活力的金融部门,现代经济就无法运作良好。

So, Obama’s diagnosis that our financial sector is in desperate shape is correct. And if it is in desperate shape, that means our economy is in desperate shape.

因此,奥巴马对我们的金融业处于绝望状态的诊断是正确的。 如果它处于绝望状态,那意味着我们的经济处于绝望的状态。

Even if we weren’t looking at the financial turmoil, but at the level of household, national and federal debt there is a major problem. We are drowning. If we look at inequality, which is the greatest since the Great Depression, there is a major problem. If we look at stagnating wages, there is a major problem.

即使我们没有关注金融风暴,但在家庭,国家和联邦债务水平上存在一个重大问题。 我们溺水了。 如果我们看一下自大萧条以来最大的不平等,就会出现一个重大问题。 如果我们看一下工资停滞不前,就会出现一个重大问题。

Most of the economic growth we’ve had in the past five years was based on the housing bubble, which has now burst. And the fruits of that growth have not been shared widely. In short, the fundamentals are not strong.

我们过去五年的大部分经济增长都是基于房地产泡沫,房地产泡沫现在已经破裂。 这种增长的成果尚未广泛分享。 简而言之,美国经济基本面并不强劲。

Gardels: What ought to be the policy response to the Wall Street meltdown?

Gardels:那么谁应当对使华尔街崩溃的政策负责?

Stiglitz: Clearly, we need not only re-regulation, but a redesign of the regulatory system. During his reign as head of the Federal Reserve in which this mortgage and financial bubble grew, Alan Greenspan had plenty of instruments to use to curb it, but failed. He was chosen by Ronald Reagan, after all, because of his anti-regulation attitudes.

斯蒂格利茨:显然,我们不仅需要重新监管,还需要重新设计监管体系。 在他担任美联储主席期间,这个抵押贷款和金融泡沫的增长,艾伦格林斯潘有很多工具可以用来遏制它,但失败了。 毕竟,由于他的反调节态度,他被罗纳德里根选中。

Paul Volcker, the previous Fed Chairman known for keeping inflation under control, was fired because the Reagan administration didn’t believe he was an adequate de-regulator. Our country has thus suffered from the consequences of choosing as regulator-in-chief of the economy someone who didn’t believe in regulation.

曾因控制通胀而闻名的前美联储主席保罗沃尔克被解雇,因为里根政府不相信他是一个适当的去监管者。 因此,我们的国家因为选择不信任监管的经济监管机构而受到影响。

So, first, to correct the problem we need political leaders and policymakers who believe in regulation. Beyond that, we need to put in place a new system that can cope with the expansion of finance and financial instruments beyond traditional banks.

因此,首先,要纠正这个问题,我们需要相信监管的政治领导人和政策制定者。 除此之外,我们需要建立一个新系统,以应对传统银行以外的金融和金融工具的扩张。

For example, we need to regulate incentives. Bonuses need to be paid on multiyear performance instead of one year, which is an encouragement to gambling. Stock options encourage dishonest accounting and need to be curbed. In short, we built incentives for bad behavior in the system, and we got it.

例如,我们需要规范激励措施。 奖金需要在多年的表现而不是一年的时间内支付,这是对赌博的鼓励。 股票期权鼓励不诚实的会计,需要加以遏制。 简而言之,我们为系统中的不良行为制定了激励措施,我们得到了它。

We also need “speed bumps.” Every financial crisis historically has been associated with the very rapid expansion of particular kinds of assets, from tulips to mortgages. If you dampen that, you can stop the bubbles from getting out of control. The world wouldn’t disappear if we expanded mortgages at 10 percent a year instead of 25 percent a year. We know the pattern so well we ought to be able to do something to curtail it.

我们还需要“减速带”。历史上,每一次金融危机都与特定种类资产的迅速扩张有关,从郁金香到抵押贷款。 如果你抑制它,你可以阻止气泡失控。 如果我们将抵押贷款按年增长10%而不是每年增加25%,世界就不会消失。 我们非常了解这种模式,我们应该能够做些什么来减少它。

Above all, we need a financial product safety commission just like we have for consumer goods. The financiers were inventing products not intended to manage risk but to create risk.

最重要的是,我们需要一个与消费品一样的金融产品安全委员会。 金融家们正在发明不是为了管理风险而是为了创造风险的产品。

Of course, I believe strongly in greater transparency. Yet, in terms of regulatory standards, these products were transparent in a technical sense. They were just so complex no one could understand them. If every provision in these contracts were made public, it wouldn’t have added any useful information about the risk to any mortal person.

当然,我坚信更高的透明度。 然而,就监管标准而言,这些产品在技术意义上是透明的。 它们太复杂了没有人能理解它们。 如果这些合同中的每项条款都公之于众,它就不会向任何凡人添加任何有关风险的有用信息。

Too much information is no information. In this sense, those calling for more disclosure as the solution to the problem don’t understand information.

太多的信息都没有信息。 从这个意义上说,那些要求更多披露作为问题解决方案的人不理解信息。

If you are buying a product, you want to know the risk, pure and simple. That is the issue.

如果您正在购买产品,您想知道风险,纯粹和简单。 这就是问题所在。

Gardels: The mortgage-backed securities behind the meltdown are held across the world by banks or sovereign funds in China, Japan, Europe and the Gulf. What impact will this crisis have on them?

Gardels:崩溃背后的抵押贷款支持证券由中国,日本,欧洲和海湾地区的银行或主权基金在全球范围内持有。 这场危机对他们有什么影响?

Stiglitz: That is true. The losses of European financial institutions over sub-prime mortgages have been greater than in the U.S.

斯蒂格利茨:那是真的。 欧洲金融机构对次级抵押贷款的损失大于美国

The fact that the U.S. diversified these mortgage-backed securities to holders around the world — thanks to globalization of markets — has actually softened the impact on the U.S. itself. If we hadn’t spread the risk around the whole world, the downturn in the U.S. would be much worse.

由于市场全球化,美国将这些抵押贷款支持证券多元化给全球持有者这一事实实际上已经缓和了对美国本身的影响。 如果我们没有将风险分散到全世界,那么美国的经济衰退将会更糟。

One thing that is now being understood as a result of this crisis is the information asymmetries of globalization. In Europe, for example, it was little understood that U.S. mortgages are non-recourse mortgages — if the value of the house becomes less than the value of the mortgage, you can turn the key over to the bank and walk away. In Europe, the house is collateral, but the borrower remains on the hook for the amount he borrowed no matter what.

现在被理解为这场危机的一件事是全球化的信息不对称。 例如,在欧洲,人们很少理解美国抵押贷款是无追索权抵押贷款 - 如果房屋的价值低于抵押贷款的价值,你可以将钥匙交给银行并走开。 在欧洲,房子是抵押品,但借款人无论如何都依旧借钱。

This is a danger of globalization: Knowledge is local because you know far more about your own society than others.

这是全球化的危险:知识是本地的,因为你比其他人更了解你自己的社会。

Gardels: What, then, is the ultimate impact of the Wall Street meltdown of market-driven globalization?

Gardels:那么,市场驱动的全球化对华尔街崩溃的最终影响是什么?

Stiglitz: The globalization agenda has been closely linked with the market fundamentalists — the ideology of free markets and financial liberalization. In this crisis, we see the most market-oriented institutions in the most market-oriented economy failing and running to the government for help. Everyone in the world will say now that this is the end of market fundamentalism.

斯蒂格利茨:全球化议程与市场原教旨主义者密切相关 - 自由市场和金融自由化的意识形态。 在这场危机中,我们看到市场化程度最高的经济体中最以市场为导向的机构都失败了,并向政府寻求帮助。 世界上每个人现在都会说这是市场原教旨主义的终结。

In this sense, the fall of Wall Street is for market fundamentalism what the fall of the Berlin Wall was for communism — it tells the world that this way of economic organization turns out not to be sustainable. In the end, everyone says, that model doesn’t work. This moment is a marker that the claims of financial market liberalization were bogus.

从这个意义上说,华尔街的衰落是市场原教旨主义,即柏林墙倒塌对共产主义的影响 - 它告诉全世界这种经济组织方式不可持续。 最后,每个人都说,这种模式不起作用。 这一时刻是金融市场自由化主张虚假的标志。

The hypocrisy between the way the U.S. Treasury, the IMF and the World Bank handled the Asian crisis of 1997 and the way this is being handled has heightened this intellectual reaction. The Asians now say, “Wait a minute, you told us to imitate you in the U.S. You are the model. Had we followed your example we would be in the same mess. You may be able to afford it. We can’t”.

美国财政部,国际货币基金组织和世界银行处理1997年亚洲危机的方式以及处理这种危机的伪君子态度加剧了这种亚洲国家智囊精英们的大力反弹。 亚洲人现在说,“等一下,你逼迫我们效仿你的做法。然而你是全球经济体的表率。 如果我们按照你的行为重蹈覆辙,我们将陷入同样的金融混乱。 你可以通过将风险转嫁至新兴国家以及第三世界,你负担得起。 然而我们不能“。

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